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Natural gas prices—National and regional issues
by Lynne Kiesling, director of economic policy, Reason Foundation, and senior lecturer of economics, Northwestern University;
and Richard Mattoon, senior economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Why are U.S. natural gas prices currently at the high end? What are the implications of
recent regulatory changes and changes in market fundamentals? This article explains
the boom and bust nature of natural gas prices and some ways to reduce this volatility
going forward.
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1. Natural gas consumption per capita, 2001
Residential Commercial Industrial Vehicle Electricity Total
( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - cubic feet in thousands - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
Illinois 34.39 15.23 22.33 0.02 3.58 76.44
Indiana 24.23 12.91 41.24 0.05 2.89 81.32
Iowa 24.29 15.69 31.63 0.01 1.97 73.59
Michigan 34.58 17.49 22.52 0.02 13.59 88.40
Wisconsin 23.36 14.25 24.73 0.03 4.17 66.54
Midwest 30.34 15.35 26.60 0.03 6.13 78.81
U.S. 16.97 10.79 26.16 0.05 19.73 80.79
SOURCE: Consumption data from the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Agency; population data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census;
and authors' calculations.
Current natural gas prices in the U.S. are
high—more than double their histori-
cal trend over the last five years—and
futures prices indicate that natural
gas supplies are likely to continue to
be tight for at least the near term.










in the Midwest.1 This
Chicago Fed Letter de-
scribes conditions that
have put pressure on
gas prices and sug-
gests some potential
strategies that might mitigate gas price
volatility in the future.
Domestic market
Natural gas markets have been dereg-
ulated for the most part since the late
1970s, when the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission first allowed com-
petitors to enter the natural gas pipeline
industry. This deregulation movement
broke the vertically integrated structure
of the natural gas industry, which had
arisen from federal interstate regulation
dating back to early in the twentieth
century. Deregulation opened up pre-
viously unrealized value creation oppor-
tunities that benefited most consumers
and some producers. As a result, by the
1990s natural gas was widely available
at very low prices, so low, in fact, that
some producers went out of business
or confined their extraction to existing
deposits. Low prices reduce exploration,
and high prices encourage it, resulting
in a boom and bust cycle, which has his-
torically been a feature of the industry.
Another development that has followed
deregulation in the natural gas indus-
try has been the creation of liquid, so-
phisticated financial markets for natural
gas. The development of a wide range
of financial instruments has enabled
risk spreading in natural gas markets.
The resulting ability to hedge risk across
time and across different market con-
ditions has substantially decreased the
volatility in natural gas prices associat-
ed with the boom and bust cycle that
characterizes extractive industries like
natural gas.
So, why the recent spike in natural gas
prices? The price increase has been
fairly sudden, but not unpredictable.
In fact, natural gas prices have been
edging up since the late 1990s. Still,
while the current and expected price
increases are the consequence of the2.  City gate gas prices,  3-month moving average
index, U.S.=100
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, natural gas
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interaction of demand, supply, and other
forces that shape the market, supply
issues seem to be a particularly impor-
tant factor.
Many analysts and energy industry ex-
perts have, correctly, pointed to regu-
latory restrictions as the prime cause
of the rigidity of natural gas supply.
In particular, they argue that limita-
tions on drilling on federal lands, in
consideration of the environmental
amenities attached to those lands, have
greatly limited exploration options.
Approximately 40% of known natural
gas reserves in the U.S. are off limits
to exploration and production.
Another potentially abundant source of
supply is imported liquefied natural gas
(LNG) from such places as the Middle
East, Russia, China, West Africa, and
the countries around the Caspian Sea.
However, the industry still has some work
to do to convince the U.S. public that
long-distance transportation of LNG is
safe. And, even if the industry succeeds
in this effort, it then has to build the
necessary infrastructure to facilitate LNG
imports onshore. LNG off-loading and
storage at port requires specific technol-
ogy in the terminals. Few such terminals
exist in North America, and they take a
long time to build. Construction of new
LNG terminals can take up to a decade,
taking into account siting and environ-
mental regulatory processes. According-
ly, LNG terminal construction and
imported supply is a long-term, though
important, response to the current
market imbalance.
Constrained supply is not the only cause
of high natural gas prices. Environmen-
tal regulation of U.S. air pollutants was
predicated on the assumption of abun-
dant natural gas as a substitute fuel.
Specifically, natural gas is a clean (and
formerly cheap) fuel for electricity gen-
eration, particularly relative to bitumi-
nous coal. Improvements to existing
power plants that have occurred in the
past 30 years have overwhelmingly used
natural gas to comply with the new
source review regulations introduced
in the early 1970s. And air quality reg-
ulations have led to a situation in which
the only economical way to build new
power plants is to fuel
the facilities with nat-
ural gas. For example,
93% of new electricity
generation capacity
that will come online
in the next two years
will use natural gas to
fuel generation.
This emphasis on nat-
ural gas as the way to




costs has had the un-
foreseen consequence
of reducing the resil-
iency of natural gas
markets. Regulatory
mandates have re-
duced our ability to
apply the lessons of portfolio diversifi-
cation to our energy choices. This is a
very high price to attach to the environ-
mental amenities of improved air quali-
ty, air quality that could conceivably have
been achieved through other means if
environmental regulations had not
specified natural gas as the fuel input.
The potential implementation of the
Kyoto Treaty exacerbates this costly bal-
kanization of fuel portfolios. Even if the
U.S. does not ratify the treaty, Canada’s
implementation of it would have a sig-
nificant impact on the U.S. market as
well. Canadian electricity generators
would have to substitute into natural
gas as they reduce their use of coal to
meet the carbon dioxide reduction
targets. If Canadian demand for natu-
ral gas increases to fuel its own power
needs, then barring a substantial and
unlikely increase in Canadian drilling
and recovery, there will be much less
Canadian natural gas available for ex-
port to the U.S. Most of our imported
natural gas comes from Canada, both
nationally and in the Midwest, so the
dislocation to the U.S. natural gas
market would be acute.2
Natural gas and the Midwest
At a June 26, 2003, conference spon-
sored by the U.S. Department of Energy,
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham
warned that tight natural gas supplies
would translate into a 20% jump in home
heating bills in the Midwest for the com-
ing winter.3 This would mean that the
average heating bill for the November
through March “official heating season”
would rise to $915. Even more worrisome
is that such an estimate is based on nor-
mal weather conditions. A colder than
normal winter would drive demand and
prices even higher.
Since the Secretary’s announcement,
natural gas conditions have improved.
The combination of increased drilling
activity, mild summer weather, and some
demand decreases and fuel switching
by large industrial users have improved
the supply balance, allowing for signifi-
cant injections of natural gas into un-
derground storage. By mid-July, estimates
of working gas in storage stood at about
13% below the previous year.4 However,
a return of warm weather could reverse
this trend toward replenishing stocks if
gas is needed for electricity generation.
Similarly, gas prices as reflected by the
futures contract on the New York Mer-
cantile Exchange have fallen 25% since
early June highs to around $5 per mil-
lion Btus (British thermal units).
However, the Secretary’s analysis points
to one of the fundamental differences
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in the Midwest versus the rest of the
nation. While much of the gas supply
problem during the summer has been
blamed on the increasing use of natural
gas to fuel electricity generation, in the
Midwest, natural gas is disproportion-
ately used for residential service and
particularly home heating. As figure 1
(p. 1) demonstrates, per capita residen-
tial use of natural gas for the Seventh
District is nearly twice the U.S. average.
Thus, high gas prices will become par-
ticularly noticeable to Midwest consum-
ers with the onset of winter. Also notable
is the heavy usage of natural gas for in-
dustrial purposes in Indiana and Iowa.
Many analysts have suggested that nat-
ural gas used for industrial purposes
will be among the first to feel the effects
of higher prices. Industrial customers
are often more exposed to wholesale
prices, and price spikes often lead to
plants reducing activity or shutting down
altogether. Industries such as aluminum,
petrochemicals, plastics, and fertilizers
are particularly vulnerable and, with the
exception of aluminum, these industries
do have a significant presence in the
Midwest. As increasing natural gas prices
raise production costs, some of these
costs are likely to be reflected in the pric-
es of fertilizers, chemicals, plastics, met-
als, and the products that use them as
inputs, such as agricultural products.
The one limited positive for the Midwest
is the relative under-utilization of gas
for power generation. As figure 1 shows,
gas use for electricity per capita in the
region is less than one-third the U.S.
average. The region’s historical use of
coal and nuclear fuel for power gener-
ation has tended to limit the use of
natural gas for electricity. Given this his-
torical investment in other generation
assets, spikes in natural gas prices during
the summer months will have less of
an impact on consumer electricity prices
in the region. But the seasonal effect
of winter weather on natural gas prices
in the Midwest remains important, be-
cause Midwest consumers rely heavily
on natural gas for heating.
Gas prices in the Midwest
Gas prices (as measured by price paid
in dollar per thousand cubic feet at
the city gate) have exhibited consider-
able volatility both nationally and locally.
However, with a few notable exceptions,
Midwest gas prices tended to be lower
than the U.S. average during the peri-
od September 2000 to October 2002
(see figure 2.) The region has benefit-
ed from its relatively lower reliance on
natural gas in the summer months, and
in 2001–02 a relatively mild winter
lowered demand.
Storage and transmission
Storage capacity is an issue in some
of the Midwest states. For example,
Wisconsin has virtually no storage ca-
pacity, and storage capacity in Indiana
amounts to only 43 days of average
usage. Storage capacity is greater in
Illinois (165 days of average usage), Iowa
(242 days), and Michigan (264 days—
however, by February 2003 Michigan’s
storage level had fallen to 51% of ca-
pacity). Michigan needs a significant
level of storage capacity because inter-
state pipeline capacity is limited, with
the existing pipelines running at 95%
of capacity. Without significant storage,
out of state gas may be unavailable be-
cause of pipeline limitations. Available
pipeline capacity is better in Illinois
(75%), Iowa (55%), and Wisconsin
(60%). Storage is a significant concern
in Indiana, where pipeline capacity runs
at 91% and current storage capacity is
slim.5 The last major pipeline expansion
in the region was the addition of the
Alliance pipeline between British
Columbia, Canada, and Joliet, Illinois,
in 2000. Since then most additional
pipeline capacity has focused on mov-
ing natural gas from the Chicago hub
to markets in southern Wisconsin and
northeastern Illinois.
Recommendations
Further deregulation that would make
energy markets more robust and resil-
ient would help stabilize natural gas
prices and provide some certainty to
Midwest businesses and homes that con-
sume natural gas. One frequently cited
recommendation this summer has been
to remove existing obstacles to fuel sub-
stitution and to the importation of LNG.
In fact, retooling existing petroleum ter-
minals to take some small LNG imports
would be a low-cost first step toward cre-
ating integrated global natural gas mar-
kets. Imported LNG is more realistically
seen as a long-run move, furthering
the resiliency and global integration
of natural gas markets.
Regulatory obstacles that constrain sup-
ply, including limitations on LNG ter-
minal construction, exploration and
drilling on federal lands, and offshore
exploration and drilling, should be eval-
uated and subjected to a thorough cost–
benefit analysis. This test would ensure
that the combined environmental ben-
efits of the regulations and the fuel
supply benefits would outweigh the
costs, including the opportunity costs
of the foregone environmental and
fuel supply benefits.
On the natural gas demand side, our
approach to air quality regulation re-
lies too heavily on natural gas. Too much
air quality regulation mandates inputs,
such as the use of natural gas or a par-
ticular coal emission scrubbing technol-
ogy. An air quality regulatory framework
that stipulates air quality objectives and
enforcement technologies that regula-
tors will employ would provide better
incentives to apply technological change
in decreasing both emissions and fuel
use. Setting outcome-based air quality
performance standards and introduc-
ing a transparent means of evaluating
and enforcing performance would pro-
vide polluters with the flexibility toimprove and innovate to find better
ways of meeting the performance stan-
dard. This innovation would reduce
costs and produce new technologies.
New knowledge could enhance our
ability to achieve higher air quality and
make available different fuels at prices
we are willing to pay.
Another constructive action govern-
ments could take to make energy mar-
kets more resilient would be to change
state-level electricity regulations to al-
low retail competition and demand-
side bidding in retail markets. An active
demand in retail electricity markets
would not only discipline the ability of
suppliers to raise prices, it would also
equip consumers with their most effec-
tive energy conservation tool. Demand
response, particularly in large indus-
trial and commercial customers, can
send signals to power producers of how
much investment in generation they
should undertake. Conservation and
shifting of demand away from costly
peak hours can actually decrease the
amount of required investment in gen-
eration capacity, as well as reducing
overall fuel use.
Price increases, such as those seen re-
cently in natural gas, transmit valuable
information to consumers. That infor-
mation enables them to decide when it
is worth it to them to conserve. Price
increases serve as the most effective in-
ducement to conservation, because they
signal to consumers large and small
that the relative value of natural gas
has increased. They also tell suppliers
when it is worth bringing more to mar-
ket and when to invest in more capaci-
ty, and through this interaction across
time and place, fuel portfolios become
more certain and prices become more
stable. Most importantly, timely price
information can help fashion appropri-
ate (cost–benefit) public policies with
respect to the environment, infrastruc-
ture, and regulation.
1 The Midwest is defined here as the states
of the Seventh Federal Reserve District—
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and
Wisconsin.
2 In 2001, 99.5% of all imported natural
gas to the U.S. by pipeline originated in
Canada. This represented 109.2 billion
cubic meters or roughly 18% of U.S. con-
sumption (BP Statistical Review of World
Energy, June 2002).
3 Melita Marie Garza, 2003, “Energy chief
warns of 20% jump in Midwest heating




4 Energy Information Administration,
2003, Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report,
July 18.
5 Underground gas storage capacity and
pipeline capacity, December 2001.